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1. Introduction
Interest rate risk refers to the exposure of a bank’s net 
interest income and the market value of its equity to 
unexpected changes in interest rates  (1). The exposure 
results from differences in the price sensitivities of assets 
and liabilities to unexpected interest rate changes, 
caused by maturity, duration, and repricing mismatches 
and the presence of embedded options in the balance 
sheet  (2).
There are three factors motivating the supervisory 
authorities’ current interest in measuring and assessing 
the interest rate risk in the banking sector. First and 
foremost, supervisors want to ascertain whether or not 
banks have sufﬁ  cient capital in place to cover the inter-
est rate risk incurred in their trading activity and asset 
and liability management. In this respect, it needs to be 
stressed that while the Basel I and II Accords represent 
milestones in supervisory policy by introducing mini-
mum capital requirements for different categories of 
risk, they do not automatically impose an explicit capital 
charge tied to the interest rate risk in a bank’s banking 
book. Instead, within the framework of Pillar II of Basel 
II, supervisors are asked to identify and monitor banks 
that run excessive banking book interest rate risk (so-
called “outliers”). Supervisors can then impose a hedge 
on these banks or ask them to hold additional capital.
A second motivating factor follows from the continuing 
importance of interest rate risk in banks’ balance sheets, 
despite the current low level and volatility of European 
interest rates and the trend towards disintermediation. 
Indeed, although fee income has become increasingly 
important, net interest income still accounts for more 
Interest Rate Risk in the Belgian 
Banking Sector
than half of total bank income. Moreover, given that 
Belgian banks ﬁ   nance a considerable proportion of 
their assets with sight and savings deposits, the effect 
of changes in market rates on the spread between 
deposit and market rates and on deposits withdraw-
als will potentially have a large impact on the ultimate 
interest rate risk exposure. Also, the risk of even small 
upward changes in long-term interest rates on the hold-
ing returns of bonds in the securities portfolio of banks 
must be acknowledged. Bond prices are potentially very 
sensitive to small policy changes that affect the short 
end of the yield curve. Campbell (1995) describes how 
initially modest Fed policy moves in 1994 triggered sharp 
increases in long bond yields that eventually culminated 
in a global bond market crisis.
Third, in the autumn of 2004 the European Commission 
is expected to endorse International Financial Reporting 
Standard 39  Financial Instruments  : Recognition and 
Measurement. The standard aims at increasing trans-
parency about a bank’s risk-taking by imposing a 
stricter and more complete recording of its assets and 
liabilities. For example, the standard does not allow 
underperforming bonds to be shifted from the trading 
book (where they are marked-to-market) to the bank-
ing book (where they are booked at historical cost) to 
(1)  Within the scope of this paper, interest rate changes are assumed to originate 
from the risk-free non-callable zero coupon bond yield curve and not from 
changes in credit risk. The reader is referred to the paper “The Determinants 
of Credit Spreads” in this Financial Stability Review for evidence about the link 
between changes in risk-free interest rates and credit spreads.
(2)  The embedded options materialize mainly in the form of sight and savings 
deposits withdrawals on the liability side and early loan repayments at the asset 
side of the balance sheet, conditional on a speciﬁ  c interest rate scenario. This 
paper will focus attention to the former. The reader is referred to Uyemura and 
van Deventer (1994) for US empirical evidence and references on the latter.158
avoid a drop in bank net income. As such, the standard 
is expected to lead to increased volatility of Belgian 
bank income and capital.  (3)
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 focuses on the 
economic rationale behind the existence of intermediaries 
that expose themselves to interest rate risk by ﬁ  nancing 
long-term assets with short-term liabilities and deposits. A 
bank that assumes a maturity mismatch does not necessar-
ily assume a repricing mismatch. So, ultimately, we should 
explain why banks do not transform long (ﬁ  xed) interest 
rates into short (variable) rates at small cost using inter-
est rate swaps, since this would effectively eliminate the 
risk exposure that follows from the maturity mismatch. 
Section 3 quantiﬁ   es and discusses popular measures of 
aggregate interest rate risk exposure in the Belgian banking 
system, reﬂ  ecting a going concern as well as a market or 
liquidation view of the banking system. The two views are 
actually complementary in constructing a complete, true 
and fair view of interest rate risk exposure. We use repricing 
tables and gap reports to gain further insight into the total 
interest rate risk exposure of the Belgian banking system. 
Given that the treatment of deposits accounts turns out 
to be of paramount importance in a true and fair assess-
ment of the interest rate risk exposure of Belgian banks, 
we also review the literature on deposit account modeling. 
Section 4 brieﬂ   y describes the supervisory framework of 
the Basel II Accord for measuring, monitoring, and control-
ling the interest rate risk of banks. Section 5 concludes and 
summarises the main messages.
2.   The economics behind interest rate 
risk exposures
2.1  Why maturity-mismatching banks exist
Individuals are typically risk averse and this characteristic 
is reﬂ  ected in their preferences. Those with an excess of 
funds typically have a preference to lend short, while those 
with a shortage of funds have a preference to borrow 
long. Still, in the presence of perfect ﬁ  nancial  markets 
(Arrow and Debreu (1954)), there would be no need for 
maturity-mismatching intermediating banks, since savers 
and borrowers would execute their transactions directly   
in ﬁ  nancial markets with sufﬁ  ciently rewarded and willing 
counterparties (see also Modigliani and Miller (1958)). So, 
the true raisons d’être of banks are market imperfections 
such as information asymmetries, transaction costs, tax 
distortions and market incompleteness.  (4)
Given the existence of market imperfections, there is a 
role for banks in bringing risk-averse savers and borrowers 
together. However, banks create a mismatch between the 
maturity of their assets and liabilities by issuing demand-
able and other short-term debt and granting long-term 
loans. Among many others Diamond (1984) and Gorton 
and Pennacchi (1990) try to understand the exact circum-
stances under which each of these two separate activities 
might require the existence of an intermediary, as opposed 
to being implemented directly through arm’s-length ﬁ  nan-
cial markets. Although this literature yields many insights, 
only a few papers address the more fundamental question 
of why it would make economic sense for a single institu-
tion to carry out both functions under the same roof. Real 
synergies have to exist between the two activities, since if 
there exist none, there would be no rationale for the exist-
ence of loan making and deposit taking banks.
Kashyap et al. (2002) show that, indeed, so long as 
markets are imperfect, synergies exist between deposit-
taking and loan-making activities. They argue that banks 
offer credit lines or loan commitments to their borrowers, 
such that the latter hold the option to draw down the 
loan on demand over a speciﬁ  ed period of time. Once the 
decision to extend a credit has been made, the borrower 
can show up at any time and withdraw funds, just as 
with a demand deposit. In that sense, banks provide their 
customers with liquidity on both the liability and asset side 
to accommodate their unpredictable needs, extending the 
original Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argument  (5). Now, 
given that ﬁ  nancial markets are imperfect, a bank cannot 
accommodate liquidity shocks instantaneously by raising 
new external ﬁ   nance, so that a buffer stock of liquid 
assets needs to be held. Holding this buffer is costly 
for several reasons  : opportunity costs, tax distortions, 
increased agency costs, etc. So, if demand withdrawals 
and loan draw downs are not perfectly correlated, a real 
synergy arises and a bank would be able to hold a smaller 
total liquid asset stock than two separate institutions 
would have to hold jointly.
(3)  The recent amendments to IAS 39 (IASB (2004)) seem to leave scope to reduce 
income volatility by applying the restricted fair value option. While hedge 
accounting imposes stringent documentation demands and is therefore unlikely 
to be used by Belgian banks, the restricted fair value option can be used as a 
short-cut alternative to hedge accounting to reduce income volatility. See the 
article “Impact of IAS 39 on asset and liability management and banks’ capital 
ratios” in this Financial Stability Review. The interested reader is referred to 
ECB (2004) for a general discussion and impact study of more fair valuation of 
ﬁ  nancial instruments.
(4) An  important  “market imperfection” in the Belgian legal environment is the 
favourable tax treatment of savings deposits (“gereglementeerde spaardeposito’s /
dépôts d’épargne réglementés”). The interest proceeds from savings deposits 
are currently tax-exempt insofar they do not exceed 3,040 euro per household, 
leading to their importance in the ﬁ  nancing portfolio of a bank (see also 
Section 3.2).
(5)  The classic motivation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) for banks to offer deposits 
derives from the existence of random liquidity shocks faced by depositors and the 
need for depositors to be insured against these liquidity shocks. The law of large 
numbers implies that aggregating over these idiosyncratic liquidity shocks leads to 
exploitable diversiﬁ  cation beneﬁ  ts.159
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Other arguments have also been raised. Dermine (2003) 
lists several synergies between loan making and deposit 
taking that lead to real cost reductions. For example, there 
could be joint operating expenses in delivering deposits 
and loans, or the terms of mortgage loans could simply 
require the opening of deposit accounts. Diamond and 
Rajan (2001) argue instead that banks commit themselves 
to bearing withdrawal risk by issuing demandable deposits. 
Hence, the bank will be committed to do the utmost to col-
lect from borrowers to repay depositors. If not, a run might 
be precipitated and the bank would fail. Similarly, Calomiris 
and Kahn (1991) argue that deposits may discipline bank-
ers and hence, by submitting themselves to demandable 
deposits, bankers may attain a lower cost of capital. Finally, 
Mester et al. (2001) argue that deposits may help banks in 
monitoring borrowers, thereby becoming superior lenders.
2.2  Why repricing-mismatching banks exist
The previous section argues that risk aversion, market 
imperfections, and real synergies in banks’ balance sheets 
may justify the existence of maturity-mismatching banks. 
However, banks can run maturity or duration mismatches 
yet still match the repricing characteristics of their assets 
and liabilities, and vice versa. For example, when a bank 
makes price-sensitive (ﬁ   xed rate) long-term loans and 
ﬁ  nances them by less price-sensitive (variable rate) liabilities, 
it can always opt to swap the long-term ﬁ  xed interest rates 
on the loans into short-term variable interest rates at small 
cost. So, we need to go one step further and understand 
why banks expose themselves to a repricing mismatch.
The existence of a positive average yield spread, being the 
difference between yields on long and short bonds, is not 
a sufﬁ  cient reason for banks to lend at a long rate and 
borrow at a short rate, i.e. expose themselves to a repric-
ing mismatch. Indeed, the short-term yield cannot simply 
be compared with the long-term yield to infer something 
about their relative returns (i.e. the ex post excess return). 
The short-term yield is an expected return over a short 
horizon or holding period, while the long-term yield is the 
expected return over a long horizon or holding period. If 
the two need to be compared, either the long-term yield 
has to be compared with the average yield of rolling over 
short-term bond yields over the life of the long bond, or 
the short yield has to be compared with the uncertain 
short-term holding return of the long bond. Both fair com-
parisons imply that expectations about interest rate dyna-
mics and rewards for being exposed to interest rate risk 
– expected excess returns or risk premia – need to be taken 
into account. Given that both components are unobserved, 
we need a model to separate yields into expectations about 
interest rate dynamics and risk premia.  (6)
2.2.1  Expectations about interest rate dynamics
The most simple no-arbitrage theory  (7) is the pure expec-
tations theory, where the assumption is made that bonds 
of different maturities are perfect substitutes. Hence 
short and long-term bonds are expected to earn the 
same return over the same holding period. Rolling over 
subsequent short-term bonds should earn the same 
return as buying and holding a long-term bond, which 
implies that the long-term yield is an average of current 
and future expected short-term yields over the life of the 
long-term bond. So if a positive yield spread is observed, 
this does not imply that long bond returns are expected 
to be higher than returns on short bonds (over any hori-
zon). Instead, the theory predicts in that case that over 
the long horizon, short-term bond yields are expected to 
increase so that both short-term and long-term bonds are 
expected to earn the same amount over the horizon of 
the long bond. Alternatively, the theory predicts that over 
the short horizon the long rate tends to rise  (8), such that 
the generated capital losses fully offset the initial yield 
advantage and expected returns are again identical.
If the pure expectations theory holds true, a yield spread 
will not lead to an increase in the market value of a bank’s 
equity, irrespective of the size of the yield spread and the 
duration mismatch between assets and liabilities. This is 
explained by the fact that the short yield on the liability 
is expected to increase over the life of the long asset 
so that the present value of net interest income exactly 
equals zero. If interest rates increase by less than what is 
expected by market participants as reﬂ  ected in current for-
ward rates, then this is actually positive for the asset sensi-
tive bank and the market value of its equity will increase. 
Duration is only (approximately) a correct measure for 
price sensitivity of equity when the implicit assumption 
that the yield curve is ﬂ  at holds true.  (9) Conversely, if the 
yield curve cannot reasonably be assumed to be ﬂ  at, then 
the forward rate curve is the relevant benchmark for 
assessing the impact of an increase in the yield curve on 
the market value of equity (see Box 1 for a simple numeri-
cal illustration).
(6)  Alternatively, we need models to separate forward rates into future yields and risk 
premia. Given the one-to-one relationship between zero coupon bond yields and 
forward rates, we choose not to discuss the latter in this paper.
(7)  A thorough review of the class of afﬁ  ne no-arbitrage term structure models is 
outside the scope of this article (see Dai and Singleton (2000) and Maes (2004)). 
(8)  Notice the somewhat counterintuitive implication of the pure expectations theory, 
namely that if the yield spread is unusually large, long yields are expected to 
increase and not decrease over the short run (and vice versa). The paradox is 
solved once one acknowledges that short rates are also expected to increase, at a 
faster pace than long rates according to the theory. So, yield spreads will still tend 
to become smaller, when they are unusually large.
(9)  Notice that in that theoretical case, the forward rate curve is identical to the 
yield curve and, hence, the market does not expect interest rates to increase 
or decrease in the future. As a result, any change in interest is by deﬁ  nition 
unexpected.160
Box 1  –   The forward rate curve as the benchmark for assuming a repricing 
mismatch
This Box aims to illustrate that a positive yield spread always involves risk. Assume that the zero coupon bond (ZCB) 
yield curve today looks as in Table 1.
Imagine that a bank considers ﬁ  nancing a 5-year government coupon bond (face value 100, priced at par, ZCB 
yield curve as in Table 1, hence with yield and coupon rate equal to 5.768 p.c.) with a 1-year revolving time deposit 
(2 p.c.). The two yields 5.77 p.c. and 2 p.c. cannot be compared as such, given that the 5-year coupon bond yield is 
the average annual return over a holding period of 5 years, while the 1-year yield is the annual return over a holding 
period of 1 year. A comparison needs to be made on the same footing (i.e. holding period). Either we compare the 
2 p.c. yield on the 1-year time deposit with the unknown 1-year holding return of the 5-year bond (given that its 
price might change), or we compare the 5.77 p.c. 5-year yield with the return of rolling over consecutive 1-year time 
deposits, where we need to acknowledge that the 1-year yields (returns) are uncertain between years 2 and 5.
However, uncertainty about future interest rates can always be eliminated by locking in future 1-year ﬁ  nancing 
costs today, using the implied 1-year forward rates derived from the ZCB yields. If future 1-year interest rates are 
locked in or future interest rates are exactly equal to the implied forward rates, which is referred to as scenario 1 
in Table 2, then the initial 3.77 p.c. margin will turn negative in later years since locked-in ﬁ  nancing costs can be 
seen to increase from 2.0 p.c. to 10.1 p.c.. The net present value of net interest income over the next ﬁ  ve years is 
exactly equal to zero, so the market value of equity is not affected.
Interest rate changes that are in line with current forward rates do not affect the market value of a bank’s equity, 
irrespective of any maturity mismatch. Only unexpected changes in interest rates will affect the market value of a 
bank’s equity. If future ﬁ  nancing costs are not locked in and if actual future interest rates are above what is implied by 
the forward rates, for example scenario 2, we ﬁ  nd that market value of equity suffers from this unexpected increase in 
interest rates. However, if future interest rates increase but to a lesser extent than predicted by the forward rates, for 
example scenario 3, the market value of equity actually increases, despite the increasing short-term interest rates.
!
TABLE 1 ASSUMED ZERO COUPON BOND YIELD CURVE 
AND IMPLIED 1-YEAR FORWARD RATES
(Percentages per annum)
(1) Implied 1-year forward rates can be derived from the ZCB yields. E.g., the 
forward rate that one can lock in today between 3 and 4 years in the future can 
be derived as 6.03 p.c. = ((1.04)3 / (1.03)2) – 1.
Time to maturity / Time ZCB yields Implied 1-year forward 
rates (1)
1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 2.00
2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.00 4.01
3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.00 6.03
4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.00 8.06
5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.00 10.10161
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2.2.2  Risk premia
It has been argued above that expectations that deviate 
from the market’s interest rate expectations may motivate 
a bank to assume a repricing mismatch. However, in reality, 
no bank is able to systematically outguess market expecta-
tions. Hence, taking positions based on interest rate expec-
tations will not lead to systematic increases (or decreases) 
in market value of equity and an alternative explanation is 
needed for the existence of repricing mismatching banks.
The existence of a risk premium or expected excess return 
turns out to be the main driver for assuming a repricing 
mismatch. The return that a long bond holder expects to 
receive over a short bond return (i.e. the risk premium) 
makes it potentially worthwhile to assume a mismatch. 
When risk premia are zero, a bank will be indifferent with 
regard to holding short or long assets and liabilities.
The liquidity premium theory builds on the pure expecta-
tions theory, but relaxes the assumption that bonds of dif-
ferent maturities are perfect substitutes. Indeed, risk-averse 
investors might very well prefer to hold short-term bonds 
because of their higher liquidity, driving up their price and 
driving down the yields at the short end. Put differently, 
investors may require a non-zero risk premium to hold the 
less liquid long-term bonds. In sum, while the pure expec-
tations theory assumes risk premia to be zero, the liquidity 
premium theory relaxes this assumption and allows them to 
be maturity-dependent (but constant over time).
In the case of non-zero risk premia, yield spreads contain 
predictions of both (short- and long-term) yield changes 
and risk premia, and we need to disentangle yield spreads 
into both unobserved components. If either of the above 
two term structure theories holds in reality, that is if risk 
premia are zero or constant over time, then yield spreads 
are optimal predictors of future movements in yields. More 
speciﬁ  cally, both theories have implications for short-term 
changes in long yields and long-term changes in short 
yields. These predictions can be tested using simple regres-
sion analysis. In post-war US data (Fama (1984), Fama and 
Bliss (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Campbell, et al. 
(1997)), short yields tend to increase when yield spreads 
are high – in line with the theoretical predictions –, but 
long yields tend to fall when yield spreads are high -counter 
to the theoretical predictions. So, to the extent that the 
yield spread forecasts short-term changes in the long rate, 
it does so in the wrong direction, amplifying the return 
differential between short and long bonds, instead of 
bridging it. Similar evidence for Belgian long-term interest 
rate dynamics is presented in Box 2.(10)
In sum, the regression evidence in the literature and in 
Box 2 suggests that neither the pure expectations nor 
the liquidity premium theory, although intuitively appeal-
ing, describes actual yield curve dynamics. With respect 
TABLE 2 SCENARIOS FOR FUTURE 1-YEAR INTEREST RATES AND THEIR IMPACT ON NET INTEREST INCOME
(1) NIIt is computed as follows: (5.77 p.c.–1yr interest rate at t) * 100.
(2) The effect on market value of equity is computed as the sum of net present values of net interest income over the next 5 years (discounting by the zero coupon 
bond yields in Chart 1). For example, the effect on market value of equity for scenario 1 is computed as: 
3.77 / (1.02)1 + 1.76 / (1.03)2 + (–0.26) / (1.04)3 + (–2.29) / (1.05)4 + (–4.33) / (1.06)5 = 0.
Year Financing cost dynamics Net interest income (NII) (1)
Scenario 1
Future short rates 
locked in or 
as expected
Scenario 2
Future short rates 
unexpectedly higher
Scenario 3
Future short rates 
unexpectedly lower
Scenario 1
Future short rates 
locked in or 
as expected
Scenario 2
Future short rates 
unexpectedly higher
Scenario 3
Future short rates 
unexpectedly lower
1 2.00 p.c. 2.00 p.c. 2.00 p.c. 3.77 3.77 3.77
2 4.01 p.c. 5.01 p.c. (+1 p.c.) 3.01 p.c. (–1 p.c.) 1.76 0.76 2.76
3 6.03 p.c. 7.03 p.c. (+1 p.c.) 5.03 p.c. (–1 p.c.) –0.26 –1.26 0.74
4 8.06 p.c. 9.06 p.c. (+1 p.c.) 7.06 p.c. (–1 p.c.) –2.29 –3.29 –1.29
5 10.10 p.c. 11.10 p.c. (+1 p.c.) 9.10 p.c. (–1 p.c.) –4.33 –5.33 –3.33
Effect on market value of equity (NPV of sum of NII) nihil –3.40 3.40
(10) No evidence is presented for the alternative test of long-term changes in Belgian 
short-term yields. Results for this alternative test are in line with the theoretical 
predictions (with respect to the sign of the coefﬁ  cient) and are available on 
request.162
Box 2  –   Do the pure expectations and liquidity premium theories of the term 
structure hold in Belgium ?
Chart 1 plots the short and long end of the Belgian nominal yield curve between January 1978 and December 2003. 
The following observations can be made. First, the yield spread or yield curve slope is positive on average, but 
has ﬂ  uctuated between –5.35 p.c. and +3.35 p.c. The last inversion of the yield curve dates from July 1993 and 
lasted until February 1994. Second, short-term interest rates are more volatile than long-term interest rates, which 
implies that non-parallel shifts of the yield curve are not exceptional. Third, the correlation between both interest 
rates is extremely high (94 p.c. in the full sample). Fourth, interest rates are heteroskedastic, i.e. their volatility is 
level-dependent.  (1)
At the very least, any candidate theory needs to explain two stylised facts about yield curves, namely that yields 
on short and long bonds move together, and that, on average, the yield curve is upward sloping. The pure 
expectations theory is able to explain the former but not the latter, while the liquidity premium is potentially able 
to explain both facts. So we focus attention on the test of the liquidity premium theory (i.e. including the maturity-
dependent constant risk premium).
The liquidity premium hypothesis is the joint hypothesis that markets are rational and that risk premia are time-
invariant. We can test the hypothesis by regressing changes in long yields on the (scaled) yield spread (formal 
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CHART 1  BELGIAN SHORT AND LONG TERM NOMINAL 
YIELDS
  (Percentages ; monthly data)
Source : NBB.
3 month yield
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where ynt is the yield at time t of a bond with remaining time to maturity n, and where  n,t+1 ε  can be interpreted as 
a one-period-ahead prediction error. Hence, the error term should exhibit no autocorrelation, although it may be 
heteroskedastic. We use White (1980) standard errors to correct for the latter.
The liquidity premium theory can be rejected when the  n β  slope coefﬁ  cient differs from unity in a statistically 
signiﬁ  cant way. In Table 1 below, we observe that the estimate for  n β  is not only statistically signiﬁ  cantly different 
from unity, but that it is even negative, implying that a larger than average spread tends to accompany a decrease 
in long interest rates, an apparent violation of the hypothesis. The results imply that a naive investor, who judges 
bonds by their yields to maturity and buys long bonds when their yields are relatively high (and not when their 
expected relative return is high, so disregarding the possible riskiness of the strategy), has tended to earn superior 
returns over the period 1978 :01-2003 :12 in Belgium.
to these results, it is important to highlight the fact that 
these regression tests are always joint hypothesis tests, 
testing that market expectations are rational and that 
risk premia are constant. Given that the hypothesis is 
convincingly rejected, the result reﬂ  ects either a failure 
of investor rationality or the presence of time-varying 
risk premia. Recently, Dai and Singleton (2002) and 
Maes (2003) have presented statistical evidence  (11) that 
the existence of time-varying risk premia and not the 
irrationality of market expectations lies at the root of 
the expectations and liquidity premium theory rejec-
tions. Both studies conclude that market expectations 
are rational, but that the reward for being exposed to 
interest rate risk is complex and time-varying, and not 
zero, constant, or simply proportional to the level of the 
interest rate (as in Cox, et al. (1985)). Other candidate 
explanations have been proposed, stressing econometric 
problems, but Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) conclude that 
the latter cannot convincingly explain the widespread 
rejection of the expectations and liquidity premium 
theory.  (12)
3.   Measuring the interest rate risk 
exposure in the Belgian banking 
sector
A bank’s net worth can be looked upon from two com-
plementary perspectives  : a going concern perspective 
and a market or liquidation perspective. Correspondingly, 
there are two main concepts used to assess interest rate 
risk :  net interest income at risk, measuring how interest 
rate shocks affect net interest income, and market value 
of equity at risk, measuring how interest rate shocks 
affect the market value of equity.  (13) In addition, interest 
rate changes may also trigger early loan repayments and 
deposit withdrawals, which cause a bank’s cash ﬂ  ows to 
behave differently from expected. So, a cash ﬂ  ow risk also 
results from the embedded options in a bank’s assets and 
liabilities.
(11) Their evidence is based on the panel estimation of the multi-factor afﬁ  ne class 
of term structure models.
(12) These explanations include small sample biases and the existence of Peso effects. 
Small sample biases may arise because of the persistence of yield spreads, 
whereas Peso problems arise if investors anticipate and price an event or regime 
change that does not materialise in-sample.
(13) Uyemura and van Deventer (1994) show that it is generally impossible to hedge 
both target accounts simultaneously against interest rate risk.
TABLE 1 RESULTS FOR BELGIUM OF REGRESSING LONG 
YIELD CHANGES ON THE SCALED YIELD CURVE 
SLOPE (1978:01-2003:12)
Source: NBB.
(1) White (1980) standard errors are used. These standard errors correct for the 
possible impact of heteroskedasticity.
α n β n
Coefficient estimate   . . . . –0.004 –1.215
Standard error (1)  . . . . . . . 0.019 0.784164
3.1  Net interest income at risk
Chart 1 shows that net interest income is an important 
component of total income for Belgian banks.(14) The 
average ratio of net interest income to total income for 
1993-2003 is somewhat above 60  p.c. for large banks 
and somewhat above 65 p.c. for medium-size and small 
banks.(15) These averages mask quite different dynamics 
and trends, however. While the ratio decreases almost 
monotonically for small banks from 80 p.c. to somewhat 
above 50 p.c., it is relatively stable for medium-size banks 
hovering between 60 p.c. and 70 p.c. The ratio for large 
banks starts and ends at the medium-size bank level but 
ﬂ  uctuates more to the downside in the middle six years 
bottoming out slightly above 50 p.c. in 2001 but recov-
ering again towards 2003. In general, the average ratio 
of net interest income to total income seems to have 







































CHART 1  NET INTEREST INCOME AS PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL INCOME FOR LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZE AND 
SMALL BANKS (1)
  (Data on an unconsolidated basis)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Small banks are defined as having less than 500 million euro of total assets, large  




The pronounced and continuous decline in small bank’s 
net interest income as a percentage of total net income 
can be explained by the big banks’ absorption of a large 
number of small banks, characterised by classic interme-
diating activities, where the remaining small banks are 
mainly the ones more specialised in non-interest income 
generating activities. The different dynamics of medium-
size and large banks’ net interest income ratios in the 
period 2000-2002 may have resulted from a stronger 
dependence on stock market performance of larger 
banks, for example through their commissions earned on 
UCITs specialised in equities.
To  ﬁ   nd out how net interest income of Belgian banks 
relates to yield spread and market interest rate changes, 
we regress quarterly net interest income on its lag, the 
yield spread, and changes in short and long-term interest 
rates. Results are presented in Table 1 for large, medium-
size and small banks for the period 1993:Q1 to 2003:Q4. 
The following ﬁ  ndings can be derived from the table. First, 
the large, positive, and signiﬁ  cant coefﬁ  cient on lagged 
net interest income for all banks suggests that the effects 
of changes in the slope of the yield curve and market inter-
est rates, if any, are only felt gradually. Second, changes 
in short and long rates do not affect net interest income 
of banks in a statistically signiﬁ  cant way. Third, net inter-
est income of small and medium-size banks is affected 
in a statistically signiﬁ  cant way by the yield spread over 
the period considered. The yield spread enters with a 
positive sign, suggesting that a steeper (ﬂ  atter) than usual 
yield curve is associated with higher (lower) net interest 
income. If the yield spread were to increase by 100 basis 
points, ceteris paribus, quarterly net interest income of 
medium-size (small) banks would increase by 0.56 (0.06) 
million euro, i.e. 6.3 (9.0) p.c. of their average net interest 
income. For the large banks in our sample, we do not ﬁ  nd 
statistically signiﬁ  cant yield spread coefﬁ  cients.
English (2002) reports results of a similar regression 
for a sample of countries based on annual data from 
1979-2001. Overall, his conclusions are not clear-cut. He 
ﬁ  nds a signiﬁ  cant positive spread effect for the US (in 
line with our results for medium-size and small banks), 
insigniﬁ  cant spread effects for 5 out of 10 countries and 
statistically signiﬁ  cant negative spread effects for 4 out 
of 10 countries. He ﬁ   nds similar results to ours with 
respect to the weight of lagged net interest income and 
the insigniﬁ  cance of the changes in short and long rates 
(with a few exceptions). From these mixed results, he 
concludes that, in addition to changes in the slope of the 
yield curve, many other factors might also play a role in 
the dynamics of net interest income, including changes 
in technology and more subtle inﬂ  uences such as banks’ 
hedging activities.
(14) “Bank product” is used for total income, being the sum of net interest income 
and other income. Bank product is used to cover costs, value corrections with 
respect to the normal banking activity and taxes. The residual is the result of the 
income statement.
(15) Small banks are deﬁ  ned as having less than 500 million euro of total assets, 
large banks as having more than 10 billion euro of total assets.165
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In general, the concept “net interest income” covers more 
than the income generated by the maturity transforma-
tion role of banks. Typically, the bank’s loan business unit 
is able to grant loans at a contractual rate that lies above 
the Euribor yield curve, and its deposit-gathering business 
unit is able to attract funds at a lower rate than it needs 
to pay in the interbank market. A matched maturity 
technique is often used to split the total interest rate 
margin (net interest income) into different components, 
attributable to loan origination, maturity transformation, 
and deposit ﬁ  nancing. This decomposition is illustrated in 
Chart 2. From the Chart it is clear that the total spread 
that drives reported net interest income also remunerates 
the bank for the liquidity and credit risks that it assumes, 
apart from the mismatch risk. The loan origination and 
deposit ﬁ  nancing spread will partially reﬂ  ect the imperfect 
contestability of the market, regulatory barriers to entry, 
and the market power of the institution. If competition 
amongst banks is ﬁ   erce, the latter spread components 
may even temporarily become negative.
It is important that management understands what por-
tion of their net interest margin is attributable to each of 
the components in order to assess the interest rate risk 
exposure of their activities. The truly risky component in 
the net interest rate margin is the maturity transformation 
spread. The bank will need to trade off the expected net 
interest income against the following risks.
–  Parallel yield curve risk. This source of interest rate risk 
stems from timing differences in the repricing of assets, 
liabilities and off-balance-sheet instruments. Even if we 
assume that the entire curve shifts up and that the total 
spread and its components remain the same, total net 
income is still at risk. Indeed, bank liabilities typically 
reprice earlier than assets (see Section  3.3), implying 
that interest expenses increase in the short run without 
an offsetting increase in interest revenues. For these 
reasons, parallel yield curve risk is also often referred to 














CHART 2  TOTAL INTEREST RATE MARGIN 
(NET INTEREST INCOME) DECOMPOSITION
  (Stylised illustration)
maturity transformation spread
total interest rate margin
= loan origination spread












TABLE 1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NET INTEREST INCOME, YIELD SPREADS AND MARKET INTEREST RATE CHANGES
(Data on an unconsolidated basis, 1993:Q1-2003:Q4)
Source: NBB.
(1) Small banks are defined as having less than 500 million euro of total assets, large banks as having more than 10 billion euro of total assets.
(2) Denotes statistical significance at the 95 p.c. confidence level.
(3) Denotes statistical significance at the 90 p.c. confidence level.
Own lag Yield spread Change in short-term 
interest rate
Change in long-term 
interest rate
Large banks (1)
Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.92 (2) 5.80 3.150 –0.94
Standard error  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.10 5.60 12.70 27.90
Medium-size banks (1)
Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.83 (2) 0.56 (3) 0.33 –1.40
Standard error  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.09 0.32 0.59 1.30
Small banks (1)
Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.74 (2) 0.06 (2) 0.02 –0.03
Standard error  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.11 0.03 0.06 0.12166
–  Non-parallel yield curve risk. A second source of risk 
originates from the yield curve changing shape, i.e. 
inverting, ﬂ  attening, steepening, etc. Short-term inter-
est rates are more volatile than long-term interest rates, 
which implies that non-parallel shifts of the yield curve 
are not exceptional. Part of the mismatch spread com-
ponent may disappear or the spread may even become 
negative. Ceteris paribus, a ﬂ  attening of the yield curve 
is worse for net interest income than a parallel upward 
shift.
–  Basis risk. A third source of interest rate risk originates 
from imperfect correlation between paid and received 
interest rate changes on different instruments with 
otherwise similar repricing or maturity characteristics. 
Basically, this source of risk originates from the fact that 
the loan spread and funding spread in Chart 2 are not 
perfectly correlated with changes in their corresponding 
market (Euribor) interest rates.
–  Embedded option risk. Finally, assets, liabilities, and 
off-balance-sheet positions often incorporate implicit 
or explicit options that can lead to behavioural maturi-
ties that signiﬁ  cantly differ from their contractual ones. 
The embedded options are generally exercised to the 
advantage of the holder, i.e. to the detriment of the 
bank. Instruments with embedded options include 
bonds with call or put provisions, mortgage loans that 
allow borrowers to repay the balance early for reﬁ  nanc-
ing reasons, and sight and savings deposits that allow 
depositors to withdraw funds at any time.
3.2  Market value of equity at risk
Although the focus on net interest income is impor-
tant, it is incomplete. The market value of all ﬁ  xed rate 
instruments is immediately affected when interest rates 
change. Whether or not these changes manifest them-
selves immediately in earnings depends on accounting 
rules. While unrealised losses can temporarily be buried 
in historical cost accounting, they will eventually surface, 
usually in the form of earnings that underperform the 
market. The market or liquidation value perspective 
evaluates the interest rate risk to a bank’s net worth from 
all interest rate sensitive portfolios across the full maturity 
spectrum of the bank. Regulators ﬁ  nd the market per-
spective very useful, since decreases in the market value 
of equity can be a leading indicator of future earnings 
and solvency problems. It can also help in identifying risk 
exposures that are not evident in an analysis of short-
term earnings. See OCC (1989) for a stylised example of 
the latter.
However, the market value approach also raises a 
number of relevance and reliability problems. For exam-
ple, swings in the market value of an instrument that 
is truly intended to be held to maturity are irrelevant 
and could potentially generate misleading intermedi-
ary reported income changes, given that the price will 
be pulled back to par at maturity. Moreover, obtaining 
a reliable measurement is sometimes difﬁ  cult  when 
markets are illiquid, thin, or non-existent, or where 
complex embedded options are included. In those cases, 
discretionary modelling assumptions need to be made, 
possibly with an important valuation impact. Finally, 
the market approach by deﬁ  nition does not allow us to 
identify the timing of the accounting recognition of the 
decline in earnings.(16)
TABLE 2 AGGREGATE BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE 
OF THE BELGIAN BANKING SECTOR
(Data on an unconsolidated basis, December 2003, 
percentages of total assets, i.e. 880 billion euro, 1993-2003 
annual average growth rates in percentage between brackets)
Source: NBB.
(1) Other deposits consist out of bank bonds (kasbons, bons de caisse) and 
certificates of deposit.
ASSETS
Interbank loan portfolio   . . . . . 26 (+2.6)
Client loan portfolio . . . . . . . . . 36 (+5.3)
Mortgage loans  . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Other loans  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Securities portfolio  . . . . . . . . . . 28 (+4.1)
Banking book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Trading book  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 (+13.4)
Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 (+4.7)
LIABILITIES
Interbank borrowing   . . . . . . . . 32 (+2.3)
Deposits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 (+4.2)
Sight deposits   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 (+10.5)
Savings deposits . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 (+10.7)
Term deposits   . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 (+2.6)
Other deposits (1)   . . . . . . . . . . . 8( –3.3)
Own equity and subordinated 
debt   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 (+9.6)
Other  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 (+15.0)
Total  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 (+4.7)
(16) These various issues are currently raised in the debate on fair value accounting 
(see ECB, 2004). The article “Impact of IAS 39 on asset and liability management 
and banks’ capital ratios” in this Financial Stability Review tries to look ahead 
by assessing the likely implications of the new ﬁ  nancial reporting standards on a 
stylised balance sheet.167
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Table 2 reﬂ   ects the aggregate balance sheet of the 
Belgian banking sector on December 2003, where the 
entries between brackets represent estimates of aver-
age annual growth rates in the respective balance sheet 
accounts over the last ten years. At the end of 2003, total 
assets in the Belgian banking system equated 880 billion 
euro or about 330 p.c. of nominal Belgian GDP. The cor-
responding ratio for the Netherlands is similar (345 p.c.), 
it is somewhat lower for France and Germany (266 p.c. 
and 240 p.c. respectively), but it is dramatically lower for 
the UK and the US (140 p.c. and 71 p.c. respectively). This 
suggests that the latter two economies are more market 
based and less bank based systems than typical European 
continental banks. Total assets have been growing at a 
rather stable pace throughout the last 10 years, attaining 
an average annual growth rate of 4.7 p.c.
On the more detailed level, own equity and subordinated 
debt and savings and sight deposits have grown relatively 
fast on the liability side, compared to total deposits and 
total liabilities. Deposits and interbank borrowing repre-
sent 80 p.c. of liabilities. On the asset side, the differences 
are less pronounced. We see that the loan book  (17) and 
securities book together make up 90 p.c. of total assets.
Below, we measure the approximate impact that inter-
est rate changes have had on the market value of some 
Belgian banks’ assets during the last ten years. This 
exercise will be limited to the securities portfolio of the 
Belgian banking sector, since this portfolio is the only one 
for which marked-to-market prices are readily available. 
The securities portfolio represented 28 p.c. of the balance 
sheet total at the end of 2003.(18) About 80 p.c. of the 
securities portfolio corresponds to the banking book for 
which changes in market value are only recorded when 
instruments are actually realized. As this accounting 
method only records a fraction of the total, i.e. realised 
and unrealised change in market value, we used addi-
tional information available through the Belgian pruden-
tial reporting scheme to extract the difference between 
the book and market value of securities in the banking 
book portfolio. This yields a measure of the hidden cumu-
lative gains or losses in the banking book portfolio. By 
adding the yearly variations in the total unrealised capital 
gains to the yearly realised capital gains on the banking 
book, we obtain a measure of the total yearly changes 
in the market value of the banking book portfolio (See 
Chart 3). If we map the cumulative gains or losses against 
the long interest rate, we obtain a strong negative correla-
tion. This is conﬁ  rmed by a regression of total (i.e. realised 
and unrealised) capital gains in the banking book on the 
long interest rate (using quarterly data from 1993:Q1 to 
2003:Q4). The R-squared is 43 p.c. and the coefﬁ  cient 
on the long interest rate is statistically and economically 
signiﬁ  cant. Every 100 basis points increase in the interest 
rate leads to a decrease of 1.5 billion euro in the cumu-
lative capital gain, with a 95 p.c. conﬁ  dence interval of 
[–2.1 billion, –0.98 billion].
If we want to measure the market value change of the total 
securities portfolio, we have to add the value of changes 
in the trading book. Chart 4 compares the three compo-
nents of securities portfolio income, i.e. realised income in 
the banking book, unrealised income in the banking book, 
and trading book income. From the chart, the following 
observations can be made. First, total securities portfolio 
income is very volatile. The average value is 1.4  billion 
euro with a standard deviation of 4.7 billion euro. Second, 
the unrealised income in the banking book is by far the 
most volatile component, both in levels and proportion-
ally (unrealised banking book income varies between 
10 p.c. and 84 p.c. of total securities portfolio income  (19)). 
Third, the average realised income in the banking 








































CHART 3  CUMULATIVE UNREALISED CAPITAL GAINS OR 
LOSSES IN THE BANKING BOOK
  (Data on an unconsolidated basis, billions of euro unless 
stated otherwise)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Average actual yield for loans with 6 years remaining to maturity.
Stock of unrealised capital gains or losses 
(left-hand scale)
Long term interest rate
(right-hand scale, in percentage) (1)
(17) On average about 65 p.c. of the loan book is ﬁ  xed-rate versus 35 p.c. variable-
rate. Differences across individual banks can be substantial to the extent that 
variable-rate loans dominate in the loan books of some banks.
(18) This proportion is much higher than in most other EU countries, illustrating 
the important role played by Belgian banks in the ﬁ  nancing of the federal 
government.
(19) We have disregarded the three years with negative components.168
the trading book and to only 115 million for unrealised 
banking book income. While the unrealised banking book 
income has been positive for 8 out of the last 10 years, 
it was negative in 1994 and 1999. The unrealised losses 
in the banking book can be seen to make up the bulk of 
the securities portfolio loss in those years. The long-term 
interest rate dynamics are superimposed and can be seen 
to have played an important role. Note also that, despite 
the fact that the interest rate increase was smaller in 
1999 than in 1994, we observe a larger unrealised bank-
ing book loss in 1999. Two potential explanations can be 
given for this outcome. First, given the convex relationship 
between prices and yields, the price sensitivity (duration) 
of a given portfolio increases for lower levels of interest 
rates. Interest rates were indeed lower in 1999 than in 
1994. Second, there is a volume effect in the sense that 
the volume of net assets that reprice in one year or later 
was substantially higher in 1999 than in 1994.
Of course, the discussion above only concerns the securi-
ties portfolio. Total market value effects on the asset side 
may be bigger, although there may also be some limited 
compensation on the liabilities side of the balance sheet.  (20) 
In the next section, we assess the interest rate risk exposure 
in the Belgian banking system more generally.
3.3   Aggregate gap report for the Belgian banking 
sector
Repricing tables allocate assets, liabilities, and off-balance-
sheet instruments into time bands according to the time 
remaining to repricing. They allow us to form a more 
reﬁ  ned image of interest rate risk exposure and can also 
be used to study the two measures of interest rate risk 
mentioned above, net interest income at risk and market 
value of equity at risk.
By measuring the net assets (liabilities) that remain after 
subtraction of liabilities per time band, gap reports are 
constructed from repricing tables. Gap reports are used 
to measure net interest income at risk and to indicate the 
timing of the risk. Since a bank earns a return on its assets 
and has to pay interest on its liabilities, net interest income 
is expected to change by the mismatch times the expected 
interest rate change. Importantly, gap reports can also be 
used to evaluate the effects of changing interest rates on 
the market value of equity. Duration gap reports analyse 
the impact of a change in interest rates on the market value 
of a bank’s equity. To this end, the mismatches are accorded 
risk weights that reﬂ  ect the sensitivity of the net positions 
in each time-band to a given unexpected change in interest 
rates. Finally, the weighted mismatches are added together 
and this aggregated number is typically compared to a 
measure of capital. In practice, a proxy of modiﬁ  ed dura-
tion is used to compute the risk weights. It is clear that 
if interest rates increase unexpectedly, the value of both 
assets and liabilities will drop, so that the interest rate sen-
sitivity of the assets and liabilities will determine whether or 
not equity will increase, decrease, or stay the same.
The weaknesses of repricing tables and gap reports are 
well-documented :
– There  are  potential  mismatches  within each time band, 
hence signiﬁ   cant risks may remain hidden when the 
time-to-repricing time bands are large.
–  The time value of money and the payment of taxes and 
coupons is ignored.
– In reality, the yield curve often shifts in non-parallel 
ways and is regularly upward sloping, while a paral-
lel shift and a ﬂ   at yield curve is implicitly assumed 
in assessing the impact on market value of equity 
(see Box 1).
(20) Again, we make reference to the article in this Financial Stability Review “Impact 
of IAS 39 on asset and liability management and banks’ capital ratios” which 






































CHART 4  DIFFERENT SOURCES OF SECURITIES PORTFOLIO 
INCOME
  (Data on an unconsolidated basis, billions of euro)
Source : NBB.
(1)  Average actual yield for loans with 6 years remaining to maturity.
Banking book unrealised income
Banking book realised income
Trading book income
Total securities portfolio income
Long term interest rate (RHS) (1)
(LHS)169
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–  The risks from embedded options (early loan repayments 
and deposit withdrawals) are typically not captured.
– Basis risk is not taken into account.
– The underlying assumption is that no new business is 
generated and that all maturing assets and liabilities are 
reinvested in the same time-band.
Clearly, each of the above points potentially biases the 
interest rate risk measurement. Despite these weaknesses, 
however, gap reports remain a consistent and simple 
means by which banks and supervisors can assess pos-
sible mismatches within banks’ balance sheets. Moreover, 
it is possible to accommodate some of the above weak-
nesses, for example by constructing different gap reports 
each corresponding to a speciﬁ  c interest rate dynamics 
scenario. Associated assumptions can then be made 
about the repricing characteristics of assets, liabilities, and 
off-balance-sheet instruments and about early loan repay-
ments and deposit withdrawals.  (21)
Chart 5  reﬂ  ects the aggregate repricing table for the entire 
Belgian banking system at the end of December 2003.  (22) 
Ten time-to-repricing time bands (hereafter, time bands) 
can be distinguished from top to bottom. At the long end 
(top of Chart 5) the “over 10 years” time band records all 
assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet instruments that 
reprice more than 10 years in the future. At the short end 
there is the “up to 8 days” time band recording all assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance-sheet instruments that reprice 
within 8 days. Sight deposits are by default classiﬁ  ed in 
the shortest time band liabilities (91 billion euro in total, 
i.e. 32 p.c. of “up to 8 days” liabilities).
Apart from these nine speciﬁ   c time bands, there is 
an important “indeterminate” time band (bottom of 
Chart 5), containing all assets and liabilities that cannot 
readily be classiﬁ  ed in any of the nine speciﬁ  c time bands. 
The bulk of the indeterminate liabilities is made up of sav-
ings deposits (134 billion euro, i.e. about 60 p.c. of total 
indeterminate liabilities), accrued charges and deferred 
income (23 p.c.), and own capital (14 p.c.), while deferred 
charges and accrued income (52 billion euro, i.e. 43 p.c. 
of total indeterminate assets), advances in overdrafts 
(15 p.c.), and ﬁ  xed assets (25 p.c.) account for the bulk 
of the indeterminate assets. The size of the indeterminate 
time band is certainly not negligible, being the second 
largest on the liabilities side (after the “up to 8  days” 
time band), the third largest on the asset size, and the 
second largest in terms of gap (after the “up to 8 days” 
time band).
The structure of liabilities and assets across the time band 
spectrum suggests that Belgian banks fund a net amount 
of long assets with a net amount of short and “indeter-
minate” liabilities. Although off-balance-sheet instru-
ments (interest rate swaps, forward rate agreements, 
interest options) have grown by an annual average rate 
of 16.5 p.c. over the last ten years, Chart 5 makes clear 
that their net positions do not fundamentally change the 
asymmetry in the balance sheet. While a part of the inter-
est rate risk exposure can be seen to be hedged by means 
of net off-balance-sheet instruments, there remains a 
substantial mismatch between the repricing character-
istics of banks’ assets and liabilities. Net off-balance-
sheet positions are used to decrease (hedge) the existing 
on-balance mismatches for time bands “one to two years” 
and longer, while their use typically increases the existing 
on-balance mismatches below one year (notably the “6 to 
12 months” and “1 to 3 months” time bands).
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CHART 5  AGGREGATE REPRICING TABLE OF THE BELGIAN 
BANKING SECTOR (DECEMBER 2003)
  (Data at the end of december 2003 on an unconsolidated 
basis, billions of euro)
Source : NBB.
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(21) For example, a capped adjustable rate mortgage with annual repricing could be 
considered to be ﬁ  xed rate in a strongly rising interest rate environment and a 
one-year repricing asset in a declining rate environment.
(22) Downloaded from the Belgian prudential reporting scheme. The following 
data limitations should be mentioned. First, these data are not gathered at the 
consolidated bank account level, but only on a solo basis. Second, the data 
cannot distinguish between trading, banking and loan books. Given that trading 
book positions and mismatches can be rather quickly reversed (unwound), the 
observed mismatch will be sensitive to overestimation bias. However, in Table 2 
we documented the fact that the size of the trading book positions is relatively 
small compared to the balance sheet total, hence the bias is likely to be small 
as well.170
A rearrangement of the time bands sheds more light on 
the repricing transformation activity of Belgian banks. 
Chart 6 presents the simpliﬁ  ed gap report, aggregating 
on- and off-blance-sheet positions and grouping slected 
time band, to provide a clearer view of the repric-
ing transformation role of banks (average gap report 
1993  :Q1-2003  :Q4). Given that the two middle time 
bands approximately offset each other, the chart sug-
gests that Belgian banks mainly ﬁ  nance net long assets 
such as mortgages and Belgian government bonds with 
sight deposits and net indeterminate liabilities (which 
roughly equal total savings deposits in size). Of course, 
the two middle bands do not offset each other exactly 
and some of the net liabilities up to one month may 
ﬁ   nance net long assets over one year. Also, the net 
indeterminate liabilities do not necessarily equal savings 
deposits. But if one is willing to make these assump-
tions for simplicity, two separate areas in the repricing 
schedule emerge.
The two inner time bands in Chart 6 reﬂ  ect the activity 
of banks in money markets and with large corporates 
(time advances, time deposits) and suggest that the inter-
est rate risk exposure for the positions until one year is 
rather limited. The two outer time bands in Chart 6 reﬂ  ect 
the core business bank activity of attracting deposits to 
ﬁ  nance long-term assets. While the two outer time bands 
appear to suggest a large mismatch, the key to assess-
ing the exposure to interest rate risk requires computing 
the effective or behavioural duration of sight and savings 
deposits. Despite a contractual maturity of basically zero 
for sight and savings deposits (being withdrawable on 
demand), both these types of deposits are referred to in 
the literature as non-deﬁ  ned-maturity deposits, since their 
effective maturity is not unambiguously deﬁ  ned, and is 
likely to substantially exceed the contractual maturity in 
normal market circumstances.
How should the effective duration of deposits be treated? 
Should deposits be tranched out over a number of 
months, quarters, or years or should the stable base be 
assigned to the long-term time band and the residual to 
the overnight time band  ? The answers to these impor-
tant questions will depend on the view one holds, and 
they have led to controversy between standard setters, 
the industry, and supervisors in the recent IAS 39 debate. 
Indeed, in their risk management practices, bankers 
assume this behavioural duration to be relatively long 
(typically several years), reﬂ  ecting a going concern view of 
the bank that net long assets are ﬁ  nanced with a stable 
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CHART 6  SIMPLIFIED AGGREGATED GAP REPORT FOR THE BELGIAN BANKING SECTOR
  (Average aggregated gap report, from the first quarter 1993 to the last quarter 2003, percentages of total assets)
Indeterminante
Sight deposits
Up to 8 days minus sight deposits
8 days to 1 month
1 to 3 months
3 to 6 months
6 to 12 months
1 to 2 years
2 to 5 years
5 to 10 years
Over 10 years
NET ASSETS
NET LIABILITIES Up to 1 month – sight deposits
Indeterminate + sight deposits
Over 1 year
1 month to 1 year
Source : NBB.171
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base of core interest rate insensitive deposits  (23). Instead, 
some standard setters argue that the behavioural duration 
is substantially smaller in certain interest rate scenarios 
and that it lies closer to the contractual duration of sight 
and savings deposits. In the extreme, standard setters 
consider all balances to be overnight and very rate sensi-
tive, reﬂ  ecting a liquidation view of the bank. Prudential 
supervisors fall mostly in between these two extreme 
viewpoints. For example, they argue that in today’s low 
interest rate environments deposits partially reﬂ  ect funds 
sheltered from a less buoyant stock market. As interest 
rates increase, these funds will move to more produc-
tive investments, either in or outside of the bank. This 
suggests that the assumptions about the stable portion 
of deposits should be carefully reviewed and attention 
should be paid so that the risk sensitivity of deposits is 
not understated.
In the end, the allocation of instruments with an undeter-
mined time to maturity to a speciﬁ  c time band remains an 
art as well as a science.
3.4  Deposit accounts and their embedded options
Deposit accounts constitute an important portion of the 
funding sources of a bank (see Table 2 above). Hence, 
both their volume and pricing potentially has a large 
impact on the interest rate risk exposure of a bank. While 
a deposit account looks like a fairly simple ﬁ  nancial instru-
ment, embedded options are attached that render their 
modelling and valuation complex.(24)
First, the depositor holds the option to withdraw all or 
part of the balance in the account at par. This withdrawal 
option poses a signiﬁ  cant risk for any bank, given that it 
is generally exercised to the advantage of the holder, i.e. 
to the detriment of the bank. For example, when interest 
rate increases make depositors withdraw some of their 
funds to invest them at higher returns (and in the case 
where these withdrawals exceed reserves), a bank may 
need to sell off some of the long assets at a considerable 
loss or replace the cheap deposit ﬁ  nancing with more 
costly alternatives. Of course, when a bank expects 
higher savings deposits withdrawals in the future due to 
higher interest rates, it can defend itself by buying put 
options or caps on the banking book portfolio securities. 
While the annual growth rate of savings deposits over 
the last ten years has been a sound 10.7 p.c. on average 
(exceeding the 4.7 p.c. annual average growth rate of 
total Belgian liabilities by far), the total amount of savings 
deposits between December 1999 and December 2000 
did decrease by 5.9 billion euro, i.e. –5.9 p.c. of total 
savings deposits at that time.
Second, banks hold the option to set the interest rate 
that they pay to savings deposits holders, i.e. the deposit 
rate. They change this deposit rate at their own discre-
tion, its movements being largely driven by competition 
and internal cost factors.(25) Stylised facts about deposit 
rates include the following (Van den Spiegel (1993) and 
O’Brien (2000)) :
–  Below-market rates are typically paid even after 
accounting for non-interest costs net of fees.
– Deposit rates exhibit substantial stickiness.
– Deposit rate adjustments tend to be asymmetric, dis-
playing rigidity when market rates are increasing (so 
that rate spreads become larger), and ﬂ  exibility when 
market rates are decreasing (so that rate spreads 
become smaller).
Deposited funds below a certain threshold are risk-free, 
given the existing Belgian deposit insurance scheme.(26) 
Yet, they pay rates that are typically lower than the 
corresponding risk-free rates. The market value of a 
ﬁ  nancial instrument that pays less than the rate on a 
comparable-risk investment will reﬂ   ect this arbitrage 
opportunity. Normally, such arbitrage opportunities 
are quickly eliminated by competition as other banks 
enter this lucrative market and start to bid up the 
price. However, the market for deposit accounts is 
not an active one like that for other liabilities such as 
bonds or equity, and substantial market power exists 
in retail deposit markets (Hutchison and Pennacchi 
(1996), Ausubel (1991) and Van den Spiegel (1993)). 
There are also regulatory barriers to entry, since one 
cannot simply start issuing deposits to arbitrage 
away the proﬁ   t (Jarrow and van Deventer (1998)). 
The spread between what a bank might receive from 
investing the deposited funds at the risk-free rate and 
what a bank has to pay to the deposit holders (the 
deposit rate and the servicing cost) is called an eco-
nomic rent in the literature (see Jarrow and van Deventer 
(1998)). As a result of the existence of economic rents, 
the market value of deposit account balances typically 
lies below par (Selvaggio (1996)). In other words, each 
(23) The banks argue that the dispersion of savers reduces the likelihood of a sudden 
withdrawal in the absence of a systemic crisis, and argue that deposit insurance 
and emergency liquidity assistance allow to avoid such a systemic crisis. This 
article does not deal with the liquidity risk exposure of banks, but focuses only 
on the interest rate risk exposure.
(24) Moreover, deposit accounts also offer important payment services to their holder 
which are equally difﬁ  cult to price.
(25) Note that the maximum retail deposit rate in Belgium has been regulated and 
legally capped at 4 p.c. from 1986 onwards. This cap concerns the base rate 
only, and not the growth premium (that is paid on every new amount left on an 
account during a well-deﬁ  ned period) nor the loyalty or ﬁ  delity premium (that is 
paid to each deposit left on an account during a speciﬁ  ed period). These premia 
are also capped at 2 p.c. Note that the deposit rate on sight deposits balances 
is currently very low, 0.5 p.c., and typically remains unchanged, irrespective of 
market rate dynamics.
(26) In Belgium, deposit balances enjoy a state guarantee up to a speciﬁ  c coverage 
limit per customer of 20,000 euro, which is applied to the sum of a depositor’s 
accounts at a failed bank (but no longer to each account separately). For a 
historical review of deposit insurance in Belgium and in Europe, see Garcia and 
Prast (2004).172
Box 3  –  Deposit account modeling
In this Box, we brieﬂ  y review the literature on deposit account modeling. With respect to the setting of deposit 
rates, two modeling approaches are used. It is either assumed that the bank is able to reset the deposit rate each 
period to maximise the present value of the balances (as in Hutchinson and Pennacchi (1996)), or that it resets 
the deposit rate periodically to obtain a target margin (as in Selvaggio (1996)). Van den Spiegel (1993) presents 
anecdotical evidence that deposit rate setting was used by Belgian banks to stabilise the global interest rate margin 
of the bank, so as to safeguard their important economic role as maturity transformers. Competition amongst 
banks shifted to providing services to the customers, which in turn led to the phenomenon of overbanking.
With respect to the modeling of deposit balance dynamics and their sensitivity to interest rate changes, there are 
roughly two methodologies available in the public domain. In the option-adjusted spread approach (Selvaggio 
(1996), OTS (2001) and Goosse et al. (1999)) expected cash ﬂ  ows are discounted using a discount rate that reﬂ  ects 
their riskiness, due to the option risk. The main concern is to estimate the appropriate spread, referred to as the 
option-adjusted spread (OAS), which is added to the riskfree rate such that the present value of expected cash 
ﬂ  ows calculated over many different interest rate paths equals the observed market value. The market value of the 
deposit account is its face value minus the discounted present value of its economic rents. Typically the discount 
rate is assumed to be LIBOR plus the option-adjusted spread.
The idea in the contingent claim or arbitrage-free valuation approach (see Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996), Jarrow 
and van Deventer (1998), Janosi et al. (1999), O’Brien (2000), and Dermine (2003)) is to discount at the risk-free 
rate, but after adjusting the expected cash ﬂ  ows by subtracting a risk premium. Put differently, certainty-equivalent 
cash ﬂ  ows are discounted at the risk-free rate. The embedded options are modeled explicitly using option-pricing 
techniques. Future deposit account balances are a function of the path of future interest rates. The present value 
is calculated for a stream of cash ﬂ  ows over different interest rate paths, taking into account how the cash ﬂ  ows 
will vary as interest rates change. This is usually accomplished using a Monte Carlo simulation.
!
euro of generated deposits creates shareholder value for 
the bank.(27)
To assess the behavior and cash ﬂ  ows of ﬁ  nancial instru-
ments with embedded options in different interest rate 
environments, relatively more complicated approaches 
need to be applied to a more detailed breakdown of 
ﬁ   nancial instruments. Box 3 provides a brief literature 
review. Embedded options complicate considerably the 
assessment of the interest rate risk exposure of the 
deposit-taking institution as a whole.(28) They also raise 
signiﬁ  cant challenges for those needing to supervise the 
risk in banks’ balance sheets. In fact, the complexity of 
measuring the impact of embedded options in deposit 
accounts was one factor in the decision not to adopt 
formal capital requirements for bank’s non-trading posi-
tions (Fed (1995)). The general supervisory approach 
to the measurement of interest rate risk is discussed in 
Section 4, to which we now turn.
4.   Supervision of interest rate risk and 
the Basel II Accord
Ultimately, it is up to the capital owners of the bank to 
decide how much interest rate risk exposure they would like 
to assume. The responsibility of the supervisory authorities 
is to protect depositors and debt holders against excessive 
risk-taking by the bank. This section describes the general 
supervisory framework for measuring and monitoring inter-
est rate risk exposures of banks.
(27) The present value of all future economic rents is non-zero. Indeed, banks 
typically pay premia when acquiring core deposits from other banks. A US study 
in Bank Mergers & Acquisitions (March 1995 issue) shows evidence of 49 core 
deposit transactions completed between February 4 and March 3 1995, and 
reports that the average premium paid was 10.17 p.c. of deposit balances 
(ranging from a low of 0.3 p.c. to a high of 27.1 p.c.).
(28) Within the framework of this article, we have chosen not to discuss other 
important balance sheet items with embedded options, such as bonds with 
call or put provisions and mortgage loans that allow borrowers to repay the 
balance early, with or without penalty. Mortgage early repayments occur for 
both economic and demographic reasons. Economic reasons may include 
interest rates decreasing sufﬁ  ciently for reﬁ  nancing to become proﬁ  table 
and demographic reasons may include home-owners moving to another 
region, divorcing, trading-up to a bigger house, or dying. In the US, the 
rate of demographic early repayments hovers around a constant percentage 
(about 6 p.c. per year), while the rate of economic early repayments can 
be substantially larger, up to 50 p.c. per annum when interest rates drop 
by 500 basis points or more (Uyemura and van Deventer, 1994).173
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TABLE 1 ESTIMATED DEPOSIT ACCOUNT DURATION AND DEPOSIT ACCOUNT PREMIA
Source: Ellis and Jordan (2001).
(1) Table entries are medians from the listed studies. The premia are expressed as percentage of the face value.
Sample used Sample period Transactions account Money market deposit account 
(MMDA)
Premia Duration Premia Duration
Hutchison and Pennacchi (1996) . . . 200 banks 1986-1990 6.6 6.7 7.0 0.4
O’Brien (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 banks 1983-1994 15.3 1.1 10.9 0.5
Janosi et al. (1999)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregate FED 
data 1988-1995 2.7 2.4 n.a. n.a.
OTS (2001)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thrifts 1988-2001 7.0 2.8 2.0 1.3
Both approaches always make assumptions about the speciﬁ  c arbitrage-free term structure models that is used 
for the simulation of market interest rate uncertainty (Vasicek (1977), Heath et al. (1992), Cox et al. (1985), etc.) 
and about how the deposit rate (symmetric or asymmetric) and deposit balances react with respect to changes 
in market interest rates. The deposit rate and deposit balance equations are typically estimated by means of a 
parsimonious autoregression. Ellis and Jordan (2001) give an elaborate review of the literature and summarize 
the ﬁ  ndings with respect to duration and premia estimates. The Table below, which is a reﬂ  ection of their work, 
shows that premia and duration estimates differ widely over the different studies and over the different kinds of 
deposit accounts.
Most large Belgian banks seem to use a replicating portfolio approach to model the dynamics and price sensitivity 
of their deposits accounts.  (1) The idea here is to choose the optimal portfolio of securities, ﬁ  nanced by savings 
deposits, so that an optimal trade off is achieved between the resulting average margin, the volatility of the 
margin, and the prediction error made with respect to the ex post margin. The optimal trade off is chosen by 
the Asset and Liability Committee of the bank. Van den Spiegel (1993) suggests to shorten the duration of the 
replicating portfolio when interest rates are becoming abnormally low and high, i.e. when spread and volume risks 
are increasing, respectively. The duration of the replicating portfolio can be lengthened when interest rates have 
mean-reverted to normal levels.
(1)  Goosse et al. (1999) point to some difﬁ  culties in the replicating portfolio approach and conclude that the market value of deposits accounts displays convexity, and 
that this convexity cannot be replicated by a portfolio of government zero coupon bonds.
Under current Basel I regulation, a bank is required to set 
aside capital to cover its credit and market risks, where 
the latter includes the interest rate risk in the trading book 
(but not in the banking book) (BIS, 1996). With respect 
to the trading book, a bank needs to hold sufﬁ  cient 
capital to cover the sensitivity of market value of equity 
to a speciﬁ   c and unexpected change in interest rates. 
The unexpected change is deﬁ  ned as a shock of 100 bp 
at the shortest time band, gradually declining to a 60 bp 
shock at the longest time band. The Basel II Accord (BIS, 
2003a) consists of a three Pillar approach  (29). Next to a 
more sophisticated and risk-sensitive treatment of credit 
risk and a status quo for the treatment of market risk, 
Pillar I also considers operational risk. Pillar I is basically 
a reﬁ  ned and extended version of the Basel I regulation 
and like Basel I also imposes a formal capital requirement 
on the interest rate risk that originates from the trading 
book. Pillar II of Basel II invites bank regulators to control 
the level of interest rate risk in the banking book (next to 
other sources of risk). It urges supervisors to look for the 
banks that are outliers with respect to their interest rate 
risk exposure in the banking book. An outlier is deﬁ  ned as 
a bank that would lose more than 20 p.c. of its Tier 1 and 
(29) Pillar III is about market discipline and reporting requirements and is outside the 
scope of this article.174
Box 4 –   Principles to be used by supervisors in evaluating the interest rate risk 
management of banks
The principles below represent a selection of the 15 principles that have been issued by the Basel Committee 
on Banking supervision (BCBS, 2003b) in order to help supervisors in their assessment of the adequacy and the 
effectiveness of a bank’s interest rate risk management, in assessing the banking book interest rate risk exposure, 
and in developing an adequate supervisory response to that risk.
Risk measurement, monitoring and control functions
–  It is essential that banks have interest rate risk measurement systems that capture all material sources of interest rate 
risk and that assess the effect of interest rate changes in ways that are consistent with the scope of their activities. 
The assumptions underlying the system should be clearly understood by risk managers and bank management.
– Banks must establish and enforce operating limits and other practices that maintain exposures within levels 
consistent with their internal policies.
Tier 2 capital due to a speciﬁ  c stress scenario (200 basis 
point shift of the ﬂ  at yield curve or an equivalent sce-
nario). Basel II does not impose speciﬁ  c rules about the 
behavioural assumptions that underlie the above test. 
Speciﬁ  cally, it does not impose detailed rules on how to 
treat deposit accounts. National supervisors will have the 
discretion to require additional capital or a reduction in 
the risk proﬁ  le by imposing a hedge (for example, impose 
the purchase of a cap) on outlier banks that run excessive 
banking book interest rate risk.
The Belgian supervisory authority, i.e. the Banking, Finance, 
and Insurance Commission (BFIC), employs a threefold 
approach to the supervision of interest rate risk in the bank-
ing book. First, the BFIC computes interest rate risk ratios 
on a quarterly frequency and based on gap reports of indi-
vidual banks on a solo basis, where the ratios compare the 
sum of weighted net mismatches over all time band against 
measures of capital and earnings. The weights applied to 
the gaps or mismatches are proxies for the modiﬁ  ed dura-
tion of the different net asset and liability portfolios. Banks 
with ratios that exceed certain thresholds are deﬁ  ned as 
outliers. The resulting ratios are used as detection devices 
only and not as thresholds that automatically trigger extra 
capital requirements. The supervisor is well aware of the 
possible drawbacks and of the potential risks that might 
remain concealed when using repricing tables and gap 
reports. However, gap reports remain simple tools that may 
be used to assess possible mismatches within banks’ bal-
ance sheets. The main advantage of the existing approach 
is its consistent comparison across banks. Second, outliers 
trigger on-site inspections to check more accurately with 
the bank’s own data whether or not the bank is exposed to 
excessive interest rate risk in the banking or trading book. 
Possibly further prudential measures can be and have 
been taken, following constructive dialogue between the 
BFIC and the bank under consideration. The BFIC asks the 
concerned banks to compute the duration of their assets 
and liabilities using detailed product information about 
cash ﬂ  ows and time of maturity. In addition, they provide 
the banks with speciﬁ   c assumptions and parameters, 
amongst others with respect to the assumed interest rate 
change and the duration of savings deposits  (30). For those 
banks where a speciﬁ  c duration gap threshold is exceeded 
between assets and liabilities, a speciﬁ  c extra capital charge 
is required by the BFIC. Third, the BFIC also regularly 
assesses the adequacy and effectiveness of a bank’s interest 
rate risk management and the quality of risk measurement, 
monitoring and control functions, based on general princi-
ples issued by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
(BIS, 2003b), of which a selection is reproduced in Box 4.
5. Concluding  remarks
Banks ﬁ  nance their assets by means of liabilities with dif-
ferent maturity, duration, and repricing characteristics. 
This transformation activity of banks meets an important 
need in any economy, but potentially leads to the expo-
sure of a bank’s net interest income and market value of 
equity to unexpected changes in interest rates. Ultimately, 
banks do so because they expect to earn an extra return 
or risk premium from lending at a long rate and borrow-
ing at a short rate (yield spreads are incomplete measures 
of excess returns and neglect the riskiness behind mis-
matching strategies). Moreover, because no bank is able 
!
(30) The BFIC asks banks to assign the savings deposits to the “6 to 12 month” time 
band. For its own interest rate risk assessment, the BFIC in fact considers several 
assumptions about the risk weights, the distribution of savings deposits across 
the repricing schedule, and the assumed interest rate shock, where it takes care 
to remain consistent over all institutions in each scenario.175
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to systematically outguess market expectations, it is risk 
premia and not interest rate expectations that should 
drive the maturity and repricing mismatches of banks. 
However risk premia are not stable through time, but 
ﬂ  uctuate widely in ways that cannot easily be linked to 
variables such as the level of current interest rates and 
economy-wide variables. While the statistical properties 
of risk premia can be captured by modern state-of-the-
art term structure models, an economic explanation is still 
lacking and stands as a challenge for ﬁ  nance researchers.
This paper has presented estimates for the interest rate 
risk exposure of the aggregate Belgian banking sector, 
both from a liquidation perspective and going concern 
perspective. The average ratio of net interest income to 
total income seems to have declined slowly over the last 
ten years reﬂ  ecting disintermediation, although important 
differences between large, medium-size, and small banks 
can be distinguished in the dynamics and level of this 
ratio. In line with results for other countries, this paper 
ﬁ  nds that the statistical evidence about the interest rate 
determinants of changes in Belgian net interest income is 
not clear-cut, possibly reﬂ  ecting the fact that net interest 
income captures a lot more than what is generated by 
the maturity transformation role of banks. The impact of 
current accounting practices that allow banks to smooth 
their income through shifting securities from the trading 
book to the banking book at their discretion might also 
be important. In this respect, one of the objectives pur-
sued by IAS 39 is to increase the transparency of banks’ 
risk-taking.
The repricing gap report of the aggregate banking sector 
allows us to identify the main interest rate risk exposure 
of Belgian banks. The inner time bands reﬂ  ect the activ-
ity of banks in the money market and with large corpora-
tions and suggest a rather limited interest rate risk expo-
sure, notwithstanding the fact that off-balance-sheet 
instruments typically increase the existing mismatch in 
this part of the repricing schedule. The outer time bands 
of the gap report reﬂ  ect the core activity of Belgian banks 
of taking sight and savings deposits to ﬁ  nance  long 
term assets. The interest rate risk exposure is sizeable, 
despite the fact that off-balance-sheet instruments typi-
cally reduce the level of the individual on-balance-sheet 
mismatch in this range of the repricing schedule. To the 
extent that deposit balances have a behavioural dura-
tion that signiﬁ  cantly exceeds their contractual duration, 
interest rate risk exposure may still be limited. However, 
in today’s low interest rate environment, deposits at 
– Banks should measure their vulnerability to loss under stressful market conditions – including the breakdown 
of key assumptions – and consider those results when establishing and reviewing their policies and limits for 
interest rate risk.
– Banks must have adequate information systems for measuring, monitoring, controlling and reporting interest 
rate exposures. Reports must be provided on a timely basis to the bank’s board of directors, senior management 
and where appropriate, individual business line managers.
Information for supervisory authorities
– Supervisory authorities should obtain from banks sufﬁ  cient and timely information with which to evaluate 
their level of interest rate risk. This information should take appropriate account of the range of maturities and 
currencies in each bank’s portfolio, including off-balance-sheet items, as well as other relevant factors, such as 
the distinction between trading and non-trading activities.
Capital adequacy
– Banks must hold capital commensurate with the level of interest rate risk they undertake.
Supervisory treatment of interest rate risk in the banking book
–  Supervisory authorities must assess whether the internal measurement systems of banks adequately capture the 
interest rate risk in their banking book. If a bank’s internal measurement system does not, banks must bring 
the system to the required standard. To facilitate supervisors’ monitoring of interest rate risk exposures across 
institutions, banks must provide the results of their internal measurement systems, expressed in terms of the 
threat to economic value, using a standardised interest rate shock.
– If supervisors determine that a bank is not holding capital commensurate with the level of interest rate risk in 
the banking book, they should consider remedial action, requiring the bank either to reduce its risk, to hold a 
speciﬁ  c additional amount of capital, or a combination of both.176
least partially reﬂ  ect funds sheltered from a less buoy-
ant stock market. As interest rates increase, these funds 
may move to more productive investments either in or 
outside of the bank, leaving the bank exposed to higher 
ﬁ  nancing costs. In this respect, assumptions about the 
stable portion of deposits deserve careful review, so as 
not to understate the risk sensitivity of savings deposits 
in speciﬁ  c interest rate scenarios.177
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